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THE GUN THAT DIDN'T SMOKE

by

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In a 1974 filmed interview, Craig described Weitzman as a "gun buff." Craig added that Weitzman "had a sporting goods store at one time. He was very good at with weapons. He said, 'It looks like a Mauser. Captain Fritz was holding the rifle up in the air. I was standing next to Weitzman - who was standing next to Fritz. We weren't more than six to eight inches from the rifle and stamped right on the barrel was 7.65 Mauser. That's when Weitzman said, 'It is a Mauser,' and pointed to the 7.65 Mauser stamp on the barrel.'" That interview was conducted in April 1974 by Lincoln Karle and can be seen in a videotape called Two Men in Dallas: John Kennedy and Roger Craig (Alpa Productions, 1977).

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In that film, Craig speaks very slowly and deliberately when he says the words "seven-point-six-five Mauser". In the space of a few sentences the word Mauser is used four times and the caliber is given twice. On February 8, 1975, thirteen weeks before Craig's untimely death, Massachusetts high school teacher Edgar F. Tatro wrote his first letter to Craig. In an article Tatro later wrote detailing that correspondence, he said, "Roger Craig's second letter to me contained a shocker, something I had never seen attributed to him in print before. He had written that the rifle was 'a 7.65 Mauser so stamped on the barrel'. If this was accurate, it was new information, to my knowledge, and crucial to a new investigation." 65

In a letter to coauthor Richard Bartholomew, Mr. Tatro updated his research into this. He said, "-After I wrote 'Roger Craig and 1984', his best friend and I corresponded for years. She was amazing! From her I learned what was true and false, who forced Roger to embellish his original story, who were disinformation agents among us.-I'm afraid his Mauser identification is a lie.-It's a complex and tragic story and someday I'll tell it, but several dangerous individuals are still alive and I'd rather not tangle with them." 66 While Tatro does not say it specifically, there is reason to believe Craig was forced to lie about the Mauser.

The way Craig wrote about Weitzman and the tool mark (authoritatively), and the way he spoke about it on film (slowly and deliberately) indicates that Craig's revelation - that the stamp said "7.65 Mauser" - could have had a sinister purpose. The tool stamp did not read "7.65 Mauser". This falsehood, therefore, smacks of setting up a straw man that can be knocked down. On these guns, the mark shows the caliber without the name. 67 Craig added "Mauser" for a reason. It could be that Craig purposely misspoke about the stamp as a subtle message to gun experts that he was lying. It may be a variation of the old trick whereby a person in danger cryptically lets someone know something is wrong.

Craig died May 15, 1975 of a rifle wound to the chest. It was ruled a suicide despite that fact that Craig did not own a rifle. A couple of weeks earlier, in an interview with author Michael Canfield, Seymour Weitzman had identified a man from a photograph as the one he saw impersonating a Secret Service agent in the parking lot north of Dealey Plaza just after the assassination. 68 On page eight of his 1971 manuscript, Craig told of a similar encounter between himself and a Secret Service impersonator. With Craig's death, these two eyewitnesses to the same events that Friday afternoon never got a chance to compare their stories for the benefit of researchers.

Craig's carefully chosen words, the oddity of that particular caliber number and his experience with guns support the idea that it was not a slip of the tongue. And if it was not a slip of the tongue, what else could it be but a lie obvious enough to be easily discredited or draw suspicion to his motive for saying it?

Given that, what then do we make of the Mauser identifications made by several others? Deputy Sheriff Boone said it appeared to be a 7.65 Mauser in two different assassination day reports 69 because Fritz identified it to him as such just after its discovery. He said they discussed this while Day prepared to photograph it. 70 Twelve hours into the investigation, District Attorney Henry Wade told a reporter it was a Mauser because, Wade swore, the police identified it to him as such. Weitzman's sworn affidavit - given the next day - corroborates both Boone and Wade's police sources.

The Warren Report said Weitzman was the source of the error. They based that on absolutely nothing. Weitzman never testified before the Commission itself. Mark Lane first brought Weitzman's November 23, 1963 affidavit to the Commission's attention on March 4, 1964. 71 Nowhere in that affidavit does Weitzman say that he was Boone's source. 72 Perhaps that is why it is unmentioned in the Report. 73 The Commission called Boone twenty days later. Boone never said Weitzman was his source. After hearing Boone, all they knew was that it started with Fritz, was officially reported twice by Boone, then by the press, then by Weitzman the next day. Weitzman then gave a deposition to Staff Counsel Joseph Ball on April 1, 1964, during which he seemed to perjure himself by saying no one but him said it was a Mauser.

Mr. Ball. In the statement you made to the Dallas Police Department that afternoon, you referred to the rifle as a 7.65

Mauser bolt action?

Mr. Weitzman. In a glance, that's what it looked like.

Mr. Ball. That's what it looked like - did you say that or someone else say that?

Mr. Weitzman. No; I said that. I thought it was one.⁷⁴

Weitzman was not asked, nor did he volunteer whether he was the source of Boone's reports dated the day before Weitzman's police affidavit. The vagueness of this exchange, as well as the question of perjury made it more important than ever for the Commission to question Weitzman - especially if they suspected he was the original source of the Mauser identification; but they never called him to testify.

On April 22, 1964, the Commission instead questioned Curry, Fritz and Day. Strangely, Police Chief Jesse Curry and Commissioner McCloy, who with Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin was questioning Curry, both stated they knew of no police reports or records identifying the weapon as a Mauser - again raising the question of perjury.⁷⁵ In 1976, Curry told the Detroit News that "it's more than possible" the rifle could have been switched and that due to lack of security anyone wanting to do so "could have gotten away with it at the time."⁷⁶ Fritz denied he called it a 7.65 caliber but did not deny he called it a Mauser.⁷⁷ The November 23, 1963 New York Times, however, quoted him saying it was "of unusual, undetermined caliber."⁷⁸ That certainly applies to the ancient 7.65, Paul Mauser's original 1890s design, long replaced by the 7.92 Mauser.

Day said, "I didn't describe the rifle to anyone other than police officers." Commission Counsel David Belin's question to Day had been, "Did you ever describe the rifle as anything but a 6.5-caliber with regard to the rifle itself?" Day therefore did not answer the question. Belin pressed him: "Is the description that you used with the police officers the same that you dictated here into the record from your notes?" Day answered, "Yes, sir."⁷⁹ No such dictation was made, however.⁸⁰

On June 8, 1964 Wade testified that, "-all my information came from the police and actually somebody said originally it was a Mauser but it turned out it was not."⁸¹ So on June 8th the Commission knew Fritz was first with the Mauser identification; then it appeared in Boone's sheriff department reports; followed by radio and TV reports; then twelve hours after the assassination - after Wade saw "some officer wave that gun around" and "saw somebody take it through homicide and give it to the FBI" - Wade's police sources, who got their information from Day, told Wade it was a Mauser. Only after all this did Weitzman, knowing the penalty for perjury, make his identification in a sworn affidavit the day after the assassination; bringing the minimum time of this ludicrous misidentification to twenty-four hours.

The next and most important parts of this chronology make it impossible to deny there was a deliberate attempt to pass this rifle off as a Mauser. Three full days after the assassination, a CIA report identified the gun as a Mauser. This report did not surface until 1976.⁸² Jim Marrs quotes a CIA report dated five days after the assassination which reads, "The weapon which appears to have been employed is a Model 91 rifle, 7.35 caliber, 1938 modification-The description of a 'Mannlicher-Carcano' rifle in the Italian and foreign press is in error."⁸³

This later CIA description is interesting in that it matches exactly the description of the alleged murder weapon, a description that came from the Italian Armed Forces Intelligence Service (S.I.F.A.R.). As Evica says, "-the 91 series was made up of 6.5 mm. rifles, but the original 38 model was a 7.35 mm. The Italians 'began producing many of these rifles as 6.5-millimetre caliber rifles, known as the 6.5-millimetre Model 91/38.' Warren Commission Exhibit 139 (CE 139) is one of those 91/38s, originally a 7.35 mm. rebarreled to 6.5 mm."⁸⁴ It seems that the CIA saw a need, after two days, to slowly back off of the Mauser nonsense but keep things confused by not yet committing fully to the 6.5-millimetre Mannlicher-Carcano.

The point of this analysis of Roger Craig's statements is that by the time Craig came around to talking about the rifle, the name Mauser and the 7.65 caliber were old news. Craig added only two new facts. First was his belated eyewitness account of Weitzman as the first person to identify the rifle. How did Weitzman make this identification? From Craig's second new fact: the "7.65 Mauser" tool mark on the barrel. Craig's statements then became the first and only evidence supporting the Warren Report's claim that Weitzman was the original source of the Mauser misidentification. Those who forced Craig to say this probably knew that the "Mauser" tool mark never existed. Thus, since the "Commission could not accept important elements of Craig's testimony" on other matters,⁸⁵ it was again possible to prove him wrong where it counted most, and stick to their story that Weitzman was mistaken, having only glanced at the gun before it was removed from its hiding place. Craig's cryptic call for help, if that is what it was, therefore failed.

It should be reemphasized here that before Craig made his claims about the discovery of the rifle, the Commission revealed absolutely nothing to support its claim that Weitzman was the original source for the Mauser identification. The evidence showed (and still shows) that everyone took their cues first from Fritz and then from Day. (Boone did not handle the rifle and his two "Mauser" reports followed both Fritz's and Day's examination at the scene.) J.W. Hughes did inform the authors of a new fact which, if true, partially corroborates Craig's and the Commission's

claim that the word Mauser was first uttered by Weitzman. That is a long way, however, from a Mauser identification. If this was the Commission's "source" evidence, they did not reveal it publicly. Perhaps that was because it did not tell exactly the story they wanted told.

According to Hughes, "The type of action 'Mauser' was the comment that Weitzman said he thought it was and Fritz concurred.

"WFAA-TV cameraman Tom Alyea and I have talked about this several times. Tom was standing there next to Fritz when Weitzman stated that it was a Mauser rifle and that they saw 7.65 stamped on the action." Mannlicher-Carcano does have a 7.35 mm. In the heat of the 'find' Weitzman stated 'Mauser' and everyone simply agreed. It wasn't until Day was showing the rifle off at the Police Station that it was properly identified as a 6.5 mm Mannlicher-Carcano."⁸⁶

Although properly identified, it was officially reported to be a Mauser for the next twenty-four hours without an official correction. This eyewitness account seems to confirm that there was no Mauser, and that Weitzman, imagining a "7" and a decimal point where there was none, somehow inspired the others present, including Fritz, the ranking officer in charge of the crime scene, to call it something it was not; and as discussed above, even something bizarre.

Given Alyea's film of this event, it seems that is probably what happened. The unnecessary complications involved in reenacting this scene make Alyea's claim even more plausible. There is no such thing as a 7.65 Mannlicher-Carcano. If "they saw 7.65 stamped on the action" it was some strange rifle. And if Weitzman misread the caliber on a 7.35 Mannlicher-Carcano, it was also another rifle. The question this raises is the same one we began with: Why in the world would the crime scene investigators enter into a criminal conspiracy to call a weapon easily linked to their suspect something else? Of course, it seems the other confirmation from Alyea's film is that there was no clip seen or handled on the sixth floor.

With regard to another claim made by Craig, a 1:06 p.m. time for the rifle discovery, we draw the reader's attention to the diagram (fig. 2) showing the results of a photogrammetric study by Richard Bartholomew of photos of the outside of the "snipers window" taken from the front of the TSBD just after the assassination.

The diagram shows three positions of the Sun (A, B, and C) and the length of the shadow each cast on the bricks to the west of the southeast windows. The solar positions for November 22, 1963 are accurate to within a minute of the given times.

The shadow corresponding to position B is seen in a photo taken by Jim Murray showing Sergeant Gerald L. Hill leaning out the arched sixth floor window, pointing to the corner window where shell casings were just found.⁸⁷ As Trask describes it, Hill responded to Luke Mooney who had just hollered his discovery of the expended shells. Seeing Sheriff Decker and others down on the street, Hill opened the sash of the east side of the arch shaped window pair and requested them to send up the crime lab people. Murray snapped his photo of Hill talking to them. The time, according to the shadow, was 1:03 p.m.

Trask continues the chronology beginning with Day's arrival at about 1:12 p.m. Day and Detective Robert Lee Studebaker took the elevator to the sixth floor and immediately took photographs of the shell casings. Trask is not clear on how many photos they took but they only had one camera and Day and Studebaker took turns taking two exposures each of each scene photographed. At least six exposures are shot before Day dusted the shells for fingerprints. Four of these six exposures were taken inside the cramped "snipers lair" which took time to position the camera.

Trask continues: "The photos shot, Homicide Detective Richard M. Sims picked up the shells by their ends and gave them to Day, who then processed each one by applying black powder."⁸⁸

"The three shells were 6.5mm and after they were dusted for prints, Day gave them to Detective Sims who placed the shells in an evidence envelope and marked the envelope with his initials, the date and the time, which was now 1:23 p.m."⁸⁹

"At just about the time Sims and Day were putting the spent rifle casings in the evidence envelope, they and Studebaker were summoned to the northwest corner of the building where a rifle had been spotted hidden among boxes. Though Studebaker would soon be released to return to the southeast corner to process the pop bottle and the stacked boxes for prints, the senior, more experienced Day would remain with the rifle - the most important piece of evidence."

The photo used to determine Sun position C shows Studebaker working among the boxes in the southeast corner.⁹⁰ Since that photo was taken at 2:14 p.m., according to the shadow, it does not disprove this chronology. It also means Studebaker had begun working there well over half an hour before the photo was taken.

Trask continues his narrative describing the search for the rifle. When found, Trask writes, "Boone noted the time by his watch as being 1:22 p.m., while Weitzman, glancing at the weapon, though not able to clearly examine it, thought it to be a 7.65 Mauser bolt-action rifle."⁹¹

We will return to the subject of the rifle discovery. First, however, there are a couple of observations to be made. Throughout this narrative, Trask describes the movements of WFAA cameraman Tom Alyea, who was driving back to his Dallas TV station from an assignment in Fort Worth. At 12:30 p.m. he found himself in Dealey Plaza. Hearing

the commotion on the police radio in his car, Alyea grabbed his camera and some film and arrived at the Depository at about 12:35. He witnessed the chaotic beginning of the search for suspects and joined in because he "wanted to record the gunfight." As things calmed down, Alyea continued filming.⁹²

In describing the discovery of the shells Trask writes, "In recent years Tom Alyea recounts that 'The local police were very helpful in assisting me in recording these historical events. Capt. Fritz even picked up the scattered shell casing from behind the barricade and held them in his hand for me to get a close up.' If correct, this may have been at a point following their being photographed and dusted. If not, it violated all concept of police scene documentation. This particular film scene is unfamiliar to the author."⁹³

Obviously, it does much more than violate police procedures. What is of equal interest, however, is that it puts a crack in the chronology. Trask told readers that after the photos were taken, Sims picked up the shells by their ends and gave them to Day, who began dusting them. What did they do, throw them back on the floor for Fritz to pick up before putting them in the evidence envelope? If Fritz handled them, why did the FBI not report finding his fingerprints? FBI fingerprint expert Sebastian Latona testified that he dusted all parts of the weapon. This is one of several incidents where Alyea's memory, apparently supported by his film, is at odds with the sworn testimony.

Another discrepancy that deserves attention is the fact that Latona reported finding no prints on the clip. Recall the point made above that if the cartridges did not have prints, then the clip should have been dusted by Day because logically it was the only thing handled during loading. But for the clip to be in the position seen in photos of Day carrying it out of the TSB (half sticking out of the bottom of the rifle), someone had to touch it.

Published frames of film and still photos of Day handling and dusting the rifle show no clip. If, as the Warren Report says, "the rifle contained a clip", then someone either pulled it halfway out or took it out and stuck it back in halfway. None of these men were wearing gloves. If the clip was handled, it should have had prints. Fritz is seen in Alyea's film handling the rifle with a white handkerchief. He could have done the same with the clip. But why would they be handling it without dusting it? Everything from the shells to the rifle stock, and the way it was all handled, was described in detail (except for the handkerchief).⁹⁴ If there was all this handling of the clip why did none of them mention it? Is this more proof that no clip was found?

Describing the moments right after the rifle's discovery, Trask writes, "By now most everyone on the sixth floor had congregated in the area around the discovered rifle-

"Alyea was right on the spot with the camera poised-.As [Day] crouched down to pluck the rifle from its hiding place, Alyea pressed his shutter release button."⁹⁵ Trask reproduced a frame of Alyea's film in his book next to these statements. It shows Day holding the rifle for Alyea to film. There is no clip visible.

It could be argued that the clip ejected normally and Oswald put it back in before fleeing but the absence of fingerprints makes this scenario impossible. As much as it would have helped their case against Oswald, even the Warren Commission admitted there was no evidence he wore gloves or wiped the gun clean.⁹⁶ No prints means that if Oswald did everything else the Commission claimed, he did not handle the emptied clip. The absence of prints on the clip could therefore support the argument that the clip remained stuck completely inside the magazine. If it was hidden inside the magazine, unfamiliarity with the gun would then innocently explain a failure to realize a clip existed. This argument is too short lived, however, to explain the length of time the Mauser description remained intact. They could not have missed the clip when they checked the magazine for additional rounds.

Another innocent explanation is that the rifle's discoverers simply thought the clip had ejected and had not yet been found. Since photographs of Day leaving the building with the rifle show the clip half-protruding from the magazine, it is reasonable to assume the clip was there but lodged firmly enough not to slip out during the operation of the bolt and subsequent handling at the scene. As mentioned repeatedly above, when they determined there were no more rounds in the magazine, Day and Fritz could not have avoided seeing the empty clip which was supposedly stuck inside the magazine.⁹⁷

If by some minuscule chance they missed seeing the clip at that moment, it could be argued that it was loosened by unreported, clumsy jarring or even dropping of the rifle on the way out of the building. The pride of a veteran evidence handler, along with the significance of this particular evidence, would reasonably explain why Day did not report such clumsiness. Even if no one saw the tool mark - and Day and Fritz swore they did - at the moment the clip protruded it would have become obvious this rifle was not a Mauser. Even given some ludicrous claim he did not notice it then, the HSCA stated, "Later that day, the rifle's six-round cartridge clip was removed by Lieutenant Day in the Dallas Police Crime Laboratory."⁹⁸ Day knew the rifle was being misidentified and did nothing to correct it. This helped avoid questions about the clip. Day had an exchange with Belin about this during his testimony:

Mr. Belin. Did you ever hear this rifle referred to as a 7.65 Mauser or as any type of a Mauser?

Mr. Day. Yes, sir; it wasn't referred to as that. Some of the newsmen, when I first carried the rifle out, asked me if it was a .30-06, and at another time they asked me if it was a Mauser. I did not give them an answer.⁹⁹

Alyea's film viewed unedited (along with the Murray photo of Hill), settles many questions about the chronology of events and confirms the fact that no Mauser was found - only a Mannlicher-Carcano with no clip. That means Craig was lying about the Mauser for the reasons stated above but not necessarily about the time of discovery or the closeness of the shells to each other when found.

Those aspects of Craig's story are corroborated by what Alyea says his film showed just prior to the rifle's discovery. Unfortunately, Alyea never saw that part of the film after the film editors finished with it at WFAA-TV. Alyea claims he was filming the discovery of the spent shells when Fritz arrived and forbade him from squeezing behind the stack of boxes. Instead, says Alyea, Fritz picked up the shells and held them for him to film.

Alyea describes the shells' position before being picked up as being so close together, "they could be covered with a bushel basket." Just after Fritz picked them up, Alyea says, someone yelled out the discovery of the rifle and Fritz threw them onto the floor. The official Dallas police photographs, Alyea claims, show them where they landed.¹⁰⁰

Had these film frames survived the editors' "careless" handling, they would be proof of destruction of the crime scene by the head of Homicide Division. It would be easy to discount claims about such incriminating events were it not for the fact that Luke Mooney's testimony indicates that is just what Alyea's film showed:

Mr. Ball. Those were empty shells?

Mr. Mooney. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ball. They were turned over to Captain Fritz?

Mr. Mooney. Yes, sir; he was the first officer that picked them up as far as I know, because I stood there and watched him go over and pick them up and look at them. As far as I could tell, I couldn't even tell what caliber they were, because I didn't get down that close to them. They were brass cartridges, brass shells.¹⁰¹

According to J.W. Hughes, who is now studying Alyea's film in detail, it begins with scenes of police officers searching the sixth floor, followed by footage of the sniper's nest. It then cuts to the moments after Fritz threw the shells on the floor. Fritz, at that point, is handling an unidentified rifle along with some plain clothes officers. The film then cuts to Fritz standing near the boxes where the Mannlicher-Carcano was found. It then cuts to Day removing the rifle from its hiding place.

Another major discrepancy, however, between the crime scene testimony and Alyea's account of these events, is Alyea's claim that Lieutenant Day did not arrive until forty-five minutes after the shells were found. Day was not present, according to Alyea, when the rifle was found. He does say, however, that no one touched the rifle until Day arrived. Alyea insists that his footage is not a reenactment. After photographing Day dusting the rifle, Alyea was ordered to leave. He left his camera with some police officers, but they did not continue filming.

Nevertheless, as J.W. Hughes points out, the film shows that when Day first retrieved the rifle, the bolt was open and there were no shells in the ammunition well. Hughes says he cannot determine whether or not the clip was present. But the film does clearly show that Fritz and Day did not operate the bolt or eject a live round. Therefore, if the bent clip was stuck in the magazine, it is possible that it was put there by the rifle's planters.¹⁰²

The clip's presence would then be the result of a mistake on the part of the planters, a mistake only possible if they misunderstood the ejection mechanism, or simply did not think the clip's presence or absence was important. The Mauser cover story, though, would still have been for the purpose of hiding that mistake until it was determined how to deal with it. Obviously, the decision was to say nothing about why the clip was there.

Irreconcilable Differences

There is no worse lie than a truth misunderstood by those who hear it.

- William James, 1902

A counter-argument over rifles which the authors can already hear from the more zealous conspiracy deniers concerns two monstrosities: rifles designed as a hybrid between the Mauser and the Mannlicher-Carcano. The first was the 1888 Commission Rifle which temporarily replaced the original Mauser used by the German army. It had the 1875 Mauser bolt with an altered locking system, and it used the Mannlicher system of clip loading.¹⁰³

The other was the rare and relatively unknown third modification of the Mannlicher-Carcano, the M91/38 Cal. 7.92 (the standard German caliber prior to the NATO 7.62). These modified Carcanos had an "S" stamped on the breech block to designate they accommodated the 7.92 caliber. Only a few hundred of these were made. And they were, in fact, clip-fed.¹⁰⁴ In 1905 when this caliber was adopted in Germany, the breech block of the Mauser 1898 was stamped with the "S" to indicate that the new standard caliber 7.92 ammunition was required. This practice was carried forward on the modified Carcano. Apparently the origin of the "S" was that it stood for "Spitzer", the German word for "pointed". These new bullets were just that, rather than round-ended.

The question could be raised, therefore, as to whether Weitzman, a small arms expert aware of the clip, mistook the 6.5 mm. Carcano for the rare 7.92 mm. Carcano. Then through a lack of oxygen among the book boxes or something, he imagined the old clip-fed Mauser-hybrid Commission Rifle, thus calling it a "7.65 Mauser". But aside from being a worthy tribute to Rube Goldberg and Weitzman's knowledge of obscure weapons, this counter-argument, like others presented here, is too short-lived to explain the longevity of Weitzman's "mistake".

Among those who do not deny the majority conspiracy opinion of the Warren Commission, this Carcano that uses "Spitzer" bullets might be of interest to Parkland Hospital employees Darrell Tomlinson and O.P. Wright and students of their claim that the bullet Tomlinson found on an empty hospital stretcher and gave to Wright had a pointed end. Did Weitzman conclude "Mauser" because he saw an "S" on the breech block of a second rifle?

Yes and no, because the facts show that the Mauser description was seemingly set in stone by the time Weitzman swore to it twenty-four hours after the assassination. Weitzman was merely among the group of investigators as they "discussed" the Mauser description at the crime scene in Day's presents.¹⁰⁵ However, the corroborated chronology of this discussion indicates that it took place during the filmed handling of a Mannlicher-Carcano which is not identical to the one now in evidence. "The most prominent difference is the rear 'iron sight'. On Day's gun [as seen in the Alyea film] it is significantly larger and extends all the way down to the stock's finger groove. The smaller iron sight on [CE] 139 stops short of the wooden stock."¹⁰⁶ (emphasis in original) Regardless of which modification of Mannlicher-Carcano was found, an important question that remains is over the nature of that "Mauser" discussion.

If the arguments presented here are correct, they raise two final important questions. First, why, despite its too obvious paper trail leading to Oswald, would a Mannlicher-Carcano be chosen as the rifle that will live in infamy? In 1963, as head of the Senate's Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee, Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut was experimenting with ordering arms from mail order houses in an attempt to gather information allowing Congress to stem unregulated traffic. Senator Dodd instituted the program on behalf of Colt and other small firearms producers in Connecticut who complained of foreign imports.

Oswald might have participated in this program. Dodd, a former FBI agent and long-time J. Edgar Hoover loyalist,¹⁰⁷ was also a leading member of the Cuba Lobby (which grew out of the right-wing, red-hunting, China Lobby) through which he was in touch with some of the same Cuban-exile mercenaries as Oswald. He was also investigating the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in which Oswald may have been an infiltrator.

Two of the gun mail-order houses were the ones from which Oswald ordered his Smith and Wesson .38 revolver (Seaport Traders of Los Angeles) and his Mannlicher-Carcano rifle (Klein's of Chicago). Oswald ordered his pistol two days before Dodd's subcommittee began hearings on the matter on January 29, 1963. The subcommittee's sample statistics later showed a purchase in Texas made from Seaport Traders. One of the groups being investigated for firearm purchases was one that Oswald had in his address book, the American Nazi Party. An investigator looking into interstate firearms sales at this time was Manuel Pena, the Los Angeles police lieutenant who was later one of the pivotal officers investigating Robert Kennedy's assassination. It was Pena who traced Oswald's telescopic sight to a California gun shop.¹⁰⁸ One of the primary culprits, robbing domestic manufacturers of profits, was the Mannlicher-Carcano.¹⁰⁹

After the assassination, Dodd, using CIA sources, helped the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee publish a story that Oswald had been trained at a KGB assassination school in Minsk. At the time, Dodd was on the payroll of the American Security Council, "The leading public group campaigning to use U.S. military force to oust Castro from Cuba, and to escalate the war in Vietnam."¹¹⁰

Second, how could an obviously well planned conspiracy such as this not have adequate communication between the rifle's planters and their accomplice rifle discoverers? It is perhaps the most difficult question to answer conclusively but like the arguments presented here, it originates from all of the known facts. This does not mitigate the otherwise complete explanation of these facts. Without a confession from the conspirators, there remain two general, rather obvious answers.

One, non-communication was part of the plan. The planters' primary concern was to plant the rifle in a proper post-firing condition, which they did. They could not have necessarily anticipated that experienced police officers, guided by the planters' accomplice(s), would get confused over the exact configuration of that post-firing condition. Nor could they have necessarily anticipated that their accomplice(s) would take unilateral action to correct it unnecessarily. However important, it is a small detail in a complex plan that could have been easily overlooked.

Two, assuming communication was part of the plan, trained and educated military officers are well aware that, in any overt or covert operation, preplanning is only of value until the operation begins. After that, everything is in flux. Circumstances change rapidly. Things go unexpectedly right while other things go unexpectedly wrong. The failure at the Bay of Pigs is one example. That a man of Jack Ruby's background and indiscretion had to be used to kill Oswald, in the manner that he did, is another. Breakdowns in communication happen.

In the final analysis, as with the clip, it does not matter if the Mauser was there or not. The CIA documents are proof that if there was no Mauser, it was not Weitzman's imagination belatedly supported by Craig's coerced embellishments, it was a high-level attempt to create the illusion of a Mauser. Such an illusion is necessary to avoid

31. Posner, p. 271.
32. Mark Lane, *A Citizen's Dissent*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, p. 126.
33. WR 555.
34. 4H 205.
35. 4H 258.
36. WR 555.
37. Meagher, *Accessories-*, p. 117.
38. Posner, p. 271.
39. HSCA I, 481-83.
40. (charger) Ian V. Hogg, "The Mannlicher Clip System", *The Encyclopaedia of Infantry Weapons of World War II*; (stripper clip) Interview of Mike Blackwell by Richard Bartholomew, Sept. 25, 1994.
41. Letter from J.W. Hughes to Walter Graf, May 25, 1994.
42. CE 541 (3), WR 83.
43. George Michael Evica, *And We Are All Mortal*, Hartford, Conn.: University of Hartford, 1978, p. 24. Cited hereafter as Evica, p. 24.
44. 4H 264.
45. WR 231-35.
46. 4H 264.
47. HSCA VII, 355.
48. Evica, p. 25.
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EDITORIAL

I am proud to be entrusted with the task of editing this Journal of ours, a task I will perform to the best of my ability, given the fact that I am following in the footsteps of Chris Mills, who performed with such dedication and integrity throughout his tenure as Editor. We are all indebted to Chris for all his work, and I would like personally to wish him all the very best in the future..

We must also record our gratitude to Mick O'Toole and Mike Royden , both of whom are standing down at this time from their positions as Press Officer and Treasurer respectively. Our thanks to them both and a welcome to Jeff Shulkin, who takes up the post as treasurer, and Jason Wakefield, who now becomes Membership Secretary.

There is little I can add to the praise heaped on our new Patron over the Years during which she has tirelessly collated information and inspired her Peers in the search for the Truth, I met her once, in Dallas at the ASK Symposium, and I can only describe her as a "Gracious Lady" in the true sense of the word. Thank you Mary for honouring us with your Patronage.

Finally, and as you will have read on our front pages, Dallas '63, in cooperation with COPA, are hosting the first European Conference on the Assassination, I advise everyone to send in your applications as soon as possible, as this will be a highlight for anyone with an interest in the case. To conclude, Thank you all for your continuing loyalty to Dallas '63, and be assured that I , and my Assistant editor, Pat Kelly, will do all we can to ensure the Journals continued success. Please send in any papers you feel would benefit the Journal.

Tony Saunders